I'm currently in that hellish process too... I don't know how to get out of it. Did you know that your employees will be forbidden from downloading from the App store once you launched that migration? It's a nightmare
It can be done that way, but it is definitely not the norm. Businesses will generally “purchase” (many for €0) apps in ABM that are to be used for business purposes and push those to devices, the user can then use an Apple ID to download any other apps they want for personal use.
If they’re using Managed Apple IDs they will have no access at all to the app store and won’t be able to download their own apps anymore. IT department will have to buy and assign any apps that anyone needs, even the $0 ones that only 1 person needs.
Yep. Truly horrid policy. Where I work our issued iPhones suck to use without App Store access; no Bitwarden was the killer for me personally. Everyone I checked with uses their personal email/Apple ID instead of the MAID, and there's a sword over your head if you ever accidently copy/paste something from internal emails to something like Notes which has iCloud sync (we're semi serious about leaker). Absolute failure of an MDM setup by Apple.
MDM can restrict pasteboard from managed apps to non-managed apps, as well as allowing iCloud sign-ins but restricting which iCloud services are allowed.
It's an absolute failure of the MDM server administrator for allowing such things, not on Apple.
I haven’t. Did have issued laptops that were company managed but I basically didn’t use and, in any case, I like many others reinstalled a clean operating system image and did my own support.
At most decent sized companies with a cyber security and network admin team, this is probably the fastest way to get disconnected from the internal corporate network with no way to reconnect.
I always seem to end up with local admin at the bigger places I've been at because I'm so annoying with onboarding and requesting access to download development tools.
I was talking about domain capture. If you own my apple ID just because I used the company email to register it, I will definitely consider sueing you.
Just on a personal note, tying your personal devices to your work email account is a very silly thing to do. Even if it's your company you could be locked out of your company email account at any time (HR grievance, SEC investigation, hostile takeover...) Losing access to your devices and not being able to access things like reset emails at the same time would not be fun.
This was a big pain in the ass for me to figure out. I ended up using the free version of Mosyle and hiring someone on Fiverr to help me figure out how to get the licenses assigned to our managed devices.
Apple and MDM has always been a shit show. In the days as recently as Ventura (last time I tried it), MDM bypass was as simple as "null route 4 DNS entries during install process, remove null routing after install complete, and never be bothered by it again". This is on Apple Silicon. With no workarounds or anything, upgrades work all the way up to Tahoe.
Like really Apple, that's your device "locking"? I could test activate my work Mac with my personal Apple ID while doing this, no alarm bells, nothing, effectively "It's your laptop now".
MacOS used to be excellent for a short period of time when Fleetsmith existed. Then Apple purchased Fleetsmith around 2020 and killed the product not long after.
Fortunately around the same time, JamF ended the practice of the mandatory Jamf JumpStart (£5K fee), which finally made Jamf a feasible option for the company I was in at the time.
Of course there is a kill switch. This is one of the key features of an MDM/endpoint manager. You won't be able to sell one without it. It's also built in to apple's management protocol (which most endpoint management systems leverage) and in activesync.
You just have to secure it properly. Have limits to how many one admin can wipe etc. But trust me every company with managed IT assets has this capability. Often even in BOYD scenarios! Stryker just failed to secure access to it properly and to set sensible limits.
However, the feature isn't very effective in the field. It's very unlikely for an attacker to be smart enough to bypass the password on a stolen Mac which is needed to connect it to WiFi, yet at the same time be dumb enough to connect it to the unfiltered internet so it can receive the wipe command. The overlap between these sets of people is almost zero. We do fire a wipe at every stolen computer but I doubt it ever actually happens. If it ever happens it'll be a total end user fail (like writing the password on a post-it with the laptop)
Either you will lose it to a common thief who won't be able to breach the login (99% of cases), or to a really targeted adversary who has cellebrite or something similar and won't connect it to the internet ever again. This is still the most risky scenario because if someone like that steals it, there's bound to be something really valuable on it.
In practice this is something more suited to mobile devices.
I did not. If I had known what would happen when we tried this we would have skipped the process entirely. Our staff (roughly 125) was so confused and it wasted a lot of time communicating about it, then trying to roll it back, etc.