That back of the napkin math is interesting, but I'd argue it's also not right.
JPMC wasn't just attempting to buy a large email list. Notably, they were also attempting to buy _future expected email list subscribers_.
In theory, if JPMC buys the entire company and then lets the company keep running, they'd expect the list to keep growing over time at a rate similar to whatever Frank's user growth graphs indicated.
They also, I assume, believed they were acquiring a group of people with expertise in marketing to this segment since, well, if you have a warm list of 4M people, that means you also have the abilities to build such a list, which is valuable as well.
I'm not going to try and estimate what percentage of the price was what, but I'll point out there's more to it than just the raw size of the email list at the time of the deal since JPMC didn't _just_ buy an email list and nothing else.
JPMC wasn't just attempting to buy a large email list. Notably, they were also attempting to buy _future expected email list subscribers_.
In theory, if JPMC buys the entire company and then lets the company keep running, they'd expect the list to keep growing over time at a rate similar to whatever Frank's user growth graphs indicated.
They also, I assume, believed they were acquiring a group of people with expertise in marketing to this segment since, well, if you have a warm list of 4M people, that means you also have the abilities to build such a list, which is valuable as well.
I'm not going to try and estimate what percentage of the price was what, but I'll point out there's more to it than just the raw size of the email list at the time of the deal since JPMC didn't _just_ buy an email list and nothing else.